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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this report is to provide cost of capital formulae for assessing the effects 
of taxation on the incentive to invest in oil and gas industries in Canada.   
 
The analysis is based on the assumption that businesses invest in capital until the after-tax 
rate of return on capital is equal to the tax-adjusted cost of capital.  The cost of capital in 
absence of taxation is the inflation-adjusted cost of finance.  The after-tax rate of return 
on capital is the annualized profit earned on a project net of the taxes paid by the 
businesses.  For this purpose, we include corporate income, sales and other capital-related 
taxes as applied to oil and gas investments.  
 
For oil and gas taxation, it is necessary to account for royalties in a special way.  
Royalties are payment made by businesses for the right to extract oil and gas from land 
owned by the property holder.  The land is owned by the province so the royalties are a 
rental payment for the benefit received from extracting the product from provincial lands.  
Thus, provincial royalty payments are a cost to oil and gas companies for using public 
property.   
 
However, since the provincial government is responsible for the royalty regime and could 
use taxes like the corporate income tax to extract revenue, one might think of royalties as 
part of the overall fiscal regime to raise revenue.  In principle, one should subtract the 
rental benefit received from oil and gas businesses from taxes and royalty payments to 
assess the overall fiscal impact.  This is impossible to do without measuring some explicit 
rental rate for use of provincial property.  Further, royalty payments may distort 
economic decisions unlike a payment based on the economic rents earned on oil and gas 
projects.  Instead, for comparability across jurisdictions, one might calculate the 
aggregate tax and royalty effective tax rates (such as between Alberta and Texas).   
 
 
The Effective Tax Rate on Capital: A Brief Explanation 
 
Business investment decisions are affected by corporate income, capital, sales taxes on 
business inputs and other capital-related taxes. The theory below derives the now well-
known concept: the marginal effective tax rate.  The marginal effective tax rate is a 
summary measure of the extent to which taxes impinge on investment decisions.  It is 
measured by calculating the amount of tax paid as a percentage of the pre-tax return on 
capital that would be required to cover the taxes and the financing of capital with debt 
and equity.  For example, if a business invests in capital that yields a pre-tax rate of 
return on capital equal to 10 percent and, after taxes, a rate of return on capital equal to   
6 percent, the marginal effective tax rate would be calculated as 40 percent (10 minus      
6 percent divided by 10 percent).   
 
To derive the marginal effective tax rate for resource companies, expressions are 
provided for the marginal rate of return on capital for investments in exploration, 
development, depreciable capital, land and inventories.  The gross-of-tax rate of return on 
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capital is equal to the inflation-adjusted cost of financing capital (taking into account 
interest deductibility), adjusted for taxes.  The net-of-tax rate of return on capital is equal 
to the weighted average of the interest rate for debt and the imputed cost of equity finance 
used to fund the investment by savers. The tax paid by the business is the difference 
between the gross-of-tax rate of return on capital and the net-of-tax rate of return on 
capital.  The effective tax rate on capital is equal to tax paid divided by the gross-of-tax 
rate of return on capital.   
 
In the analysis, federal and provincial/state corporate income, capital and sales taxes are 
included.  Royalties are also modeled.  We take into account various features of taxes 
such as the valuation of inventories, capital cost allowances, statutory tax rates and, for 
the Atlantic, investment tax credits. 
 
 
General Theory 
 
The modelling follows a version of Boadway, Bruce and Mintz [1984], Boadway, Bruce, 
McKenzie and Mintz [1987], McKenzie et al [1997] and Mackie-Mason and Mintz 
[1991].  There are two stages of production.  The first is an exploration and development 
phase to discover and make available reserves for extraction.  With this stage, the 
analysis is based on a flow-input-point-output process which can be considered a “time to 
build” analysis. The second stage production – the extraction phase – depletes the 
discovered reserves until exhaustion. 
 
The “time-to-build” analysis leads to lower effective tax rates on exploration and 
development compared to that characterized in Boadway et al [1987] whereby 
exploration and development expenditures result in reserves that can be immediately 
exhausted.  The underlying reason is that the income and expenses are mismatched as tax 
deductions for exploration and development spending are taken prior to income being 
earned when the resource is exploited.  If deductions could be taken (delayed) until 
resources are exploited, the analysis would in essence, become similar to Boadway et al 
[1987] resulting in higher effective tax rates.    
 
A number of important assumptions are made in this modelling.  
 
• Investor Objectives:  Businesses maximize the present value, V, of their nominal 
cash flows, CFt, discounted by the nominal interest rate, R = Bi(1-u)+(1-B)ρ,      
with B signifying the portion of investment financed by debt, i is the nominal 
interest rate on debt, u is the federal and provincial the corporate income tax rate 
(u = uf + up) and ρ is nominal discount rate for equity.  Debt is taken to be a fixed 
portion of capital and unchanging over time.  This assumption is different than the 
alternative model whereby debt is issued until the marginal tax benefit from 
issuing debt is equal to the marginal attendant costs incurred with debt.  As 
Mackie-Mason and Mintz [1991] show, the debt-capital ratio will rise during the 
building phase until the project is completed. 
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• The Firm’s Decisions:  The firm maximizes its present value of cash flows by 
choosing its optimal extraction of oil and gas from discovered reserves (Qt), 
investments in post-production depreciable capital (Kt) and pre-production 
exploration and development (et,).  Below, other forms of capital investment will 
be considered but not formally included in the model (for simplicity) including 
processing, inventory and development investments. 
 
• Investor Market Equilibrium:  The nominal discount rate for equity is determined 
from an international capital market equilibrium whereby the after-tax returns on 
equity and bonds are equal to each other: i(1-m) = ρ(1-Ө), with m is the average 
worldwide personal tax rate on bond interest and Ө is the average personal 
worldwide personal tax rate on equity returns (that in turn is a weighted average 
of capital gains and dividend taxes).  In this formulation, the capital gains arising 
from currency revaluation affects nominal interest rates and is taxed at a different 
rate than m or t but for simplicity we assume currency gains are taxed as part of 
interest or equity income.1 
 
The problem for the oil and gas business is to maximize the cash flows from its project 
subject to the constraint that the extracted resources is equal to the amounts discovered 
over time. Let T be the period in which reserves are discovered and prepared for 
extraction that begins at that time.   
   
(1) Max V = ∑0∞ (1+R)-tCFt dt   
 
(2) subject to  ∑T∞ Qtdt = X = ∑0T f[et]  (accumulated reserves equals total 
extraction) 
 
with  CFt  = PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t - Tc[t] – TR[t] for t ≥ T 
         
CFt  =  – et (1+π)t - Tc[t] for t≤T 
 
C(Qt,Kt) are current costs that are strictly concave in output (denoted as C’>0 and C”>0) 
and capital that reduces costs (denoted as CK<0 and CKK<0). 
Kt = depreciable capital stock 
kt = new investment = Kt+1 - Kt 
δ= economic depreciation 
f[et] = reserves of oil and gas found through spending on exploration in period t with the 
function being strictly concave (f ’>0 and f ”<0). 
Tc[t] = corporate tax payments (paid in each period and can be negative) 
TR[t] = royalty payments in each period t (only paid after extraction begins) 
Pt = nominal price of output normalized to one and equal to all other prices (Pt = P(1+π)t). 
                                                
1 See Boadway, Bruce and Mintz [1984].  For example, two interest rates on domestic and foreign bond    
(* indicating foreign) would be linked as i(1-m) = i*(1-m) + ρ(1-c) with ρ denoting the appreciation of the 
foreign currency relative to the domestic one.  If c=m or Ө, then the international equilibrium for bond and 
equity is specified accordingly. 
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The analysis below first focuses on Alberta with corporate income taxes and royalty 
payments for both conventional and non-conventional sources.  Capital taxes are being 
phased out in Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia and hence ignored.  Sales taxes on capital 
purchases are considered for British Columbia and Saskatchewan with retail sales taxes.    
 
Corporate tax for oil and gas companies is imposed on the revenues earned from the sale 
of oil and gas net of the costs of production which include current extraction costs, capital 
costs allowances and exploration and development costs (exploration is expensed but 
development is capitalized and written off at the declining balance rate σ).  This implies 
the following: 
 
(3) Tc[t] = u{PtQt- C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t - αDt - σEt(1+π)t -  TR[t]} 
 
(4) Dt = (δKs+ks)(1+π)t – αDs  
 
(5) Et = et(1+π)t – σEs  
 
(6) with α = capital cost allowance rate, Ds = the undepreciated capital cost base 
and Es = the undepreciated “stock” of exploration and development spending 
at time s.   
 
Manipulating the terms associated with capital cost allowances and investment, 
(δKt+kt)(1+π)t, in equation (1) with the insertion of terms in (3), (4) and (5), one can 
show that the investment costs are reduced by the present value of capital allowances so 
that: 
 
(2’)   CFt  = { P0Qt-C(Qt,Kt)}(1-u)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1-uZ)(1+π)t – TR[t](1-u)  
 
for t ≥ T 
 
(2’)   CFt = – et(1-uZ)(1+π)t – TR[t](1-u) for t < T 
 
 with Z = α/(α+R) 2 
 
In 2’, it also assumed that the deductibility of resource royalties from income is fully 
phased in and, therefore, the resource allowance no longer applies.  Note that royalty 
payments in the exploration and development phase are “negative” if such costs are 
deductible from the royalty base, which will be the case in some situations.  All provinces 
with oil and gas production provide for the deductibility of resource royalties from 
income (Ontario is the only province that continues to use the resource allowance that 
applies to mining). 
 
                                                
2 The half-year convention is ignored here.  When incorporated, Z = α/2 + (1-α/2)/(1+R)(α+R).  We will 
also discuss the case when capital cost deductions cannot be used against income at a later point. 
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In the next section, the analysis begins with Alberta conventional and non-conventional 
oil and gas to be followed by Alberta non-conventional oil (oil sands). Other provinces 
will follow. 
 
 
Oil and Gas in Alberta 
 
Tax and royalty regimes differ for conventional and non-conventional oil and gas.  With 
conventional oil and gas, royalties are a percentage of the value of extracted output and 
corporate income tax system allows companies to deduct exploration and development 
expenses against other income earned.  With non-conventional oil and gas, the royalty is 
a percentage of the project’s cash flow and accelerated capital cost allowances for oil and 
gas (CCA in excess of 30 percent declining balance) can only be taken against the 
project’s income (the March 19, 2007 federal budget phased out the accelerated capital 
cost allowance for oil sands).  
 
 
Conventional Oil and Gas in Alberta 
 
As stated, the royalty payment is based on the value of production. Let τ be the ad 
valorem payment on sales, PQ, so that TR = τPQ (suppressing time scripts here on in 
unless needed).  Maximizing equation (1), subject to (2) and (2’), choosing Q, K, k, and  
E, yields the following: 
 
 
Output Decision 
 
The choice of Q yields the following result (λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint 
in (2)):  
 
(7) (1+r)-t (P(1-τ)- C’)(1-u) = λ 
 
with r =  R – π = Bi(1-u)+(1-B)ρ – π. 
 
The shadow price of extracted output is equal to marginal value of extracting a marginal 
unit of output.  
 
Differentiating (7) for time (let p denote the time change in the price), yields the familiar 
Hotelling condition that the increase in the quasi-rents from rent extraction is equal to the 
discount rate:     
(8) (p(1-τ) – C’)/(P(1-τ) – C”) = r 
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The royalty rate on ad valorem sales generally reduces quasi-rents and the incentive to 
extract since the royalty reduces revenues relative to costs of extraction.3  On the other 
hand, the deductibility of interest expense from taxable income lowers the cost of finance 
and, therefore, increases extraction to early periods. 
 
 
Depreciable Capital  
 
The choice of capital stock and new investment, post-exploration and development, as 
well as the undepreciated capital cost base and changes to it, yields the following cost of 
capital for depreciable capital: 
 
(9) -CK =  (δ+R-π)(1-uZ)/(1-u)  
 
This is the familiar cost of capital expression noting that R is the weighted average of the 
cost of debt and equity finance and Z is the present value of depreciation. Note, given the 
characterization of capital as providing a reduction in current (e.g. labour) costs, holding 
output constant royalty payments based on output are constant and therefore do not 
directly affect the cost of capital.  
 
 
Inventory 
 
With First-in-First-out (FIFO) accounting, the nominal profit from holding inventories (I) 
is subject to corporate income tax.  This implies the following cost of capital assuming 
inventories are held for less than one year: 
 
(10) –CI =  (R-π(1-u))/(1-u). 
 
 
Exploration and Development 
 
The choice of exploration and development, E, yields the following for the cost of 
capital: 
 
(11) (PT–CT’)ft’ = (1-uZ)(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u){1- τP/(P –C’)}] 
 
Expression (11) treats royalties as a tax.  The quasi-rent earned by investing in 
exploration (PT–CT’)ft’ is equal to the interest-adjusted cost of exploration (the price of 
exploration and development is set equal to unity) divided by the one minus the royalty 
imposed on the cost of capital. The term in the denominator τP/(P–C’) is the advalorem 
tax paid as a share of the quasi-rents on incremental sales (this is expected to be less than 
one so long as the advalorem tax rate is less than margin (P–C’)/P).  As in Mackie-Mason 
                                                
3 This can be seen by differentiating the Euler condition (7) with respect to τ.  Assuming output prices are 
determined by world market conditions and unaffected by tax and royalty rates in Canada, we obtain the 
following by differentiating equation (7):  ∂Q/∂τ = P/-C” < 0. 
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and Mintz [1991], the cost of exploration is reduced by interest deductions taken early at 
time t relative to the earning of income at time T.4   Given the deductibility of interest 
expense from income, the effect of corporate taxation is to reduce the real cost of finance 
(r) and the discount factor (1+r) (T-t) resulting in a lower cost of capital (and lower 
effective tax rate on capital). 
 
If royalties are treated as a cost, the expensing of exploration leads to negative effective 
tax rate given that the corporate income tax rate is imbedded in the expression for the cost 
of finance: 
 
(12) (PT(1-τ) – CT’)ft’ = (1-uZ)(1+r)(T-t)/(1-u) 
 
Note under expensing for exploration, Z=1.  The terms (1-u) in expression (12) cancel 
out, implying neutrality. However, unlike the Boadway, Bruce, McKenzie and Mintz 
[1987] analysis, the “time to build capital” implies that early use of deductions for 
interest expense under the corporate income tax lowers the cost of finance and hence 
increases the incentive to explore.    
 
 
Non-conventional Oil (Oil Sands) 
 
The non-conventional royalty tax is assessed on the cash flow earned by oil companies 
engaged in oil sand production. Cash flow is equal to the revenues net of both current and 
capital costs incurred in undertaking the project.  Interest expense is not deductible (since 
it would give undue advantage to investments since capital costs are already expensed) 
and unused deductions are carried forward to be written off in later years, indexed at the 
equivalent of the government bond rate (the investment allowance).   
 
Until 2009, a minimum royalty of 1 percent of sales is applied when capital costs are 
written off but for the analysis below we ignore this payment (where this will have a 
small impact in increasing the effective tax rate when royalties are treated like taxes).  
After 2009, the royalty on sales is 1 percent for oil prices below $55 (Canadian dollar 
price for West Texas Intermediate) but rising up to a maximum of 9 percent when oil 
prices peak above $120.  For this case, the previous equations for conventional oil and 
gas are relevant in determining the effective tax rate on oil sand investments if the 
minimum royalty is paid.   
 
Prior to 2009, the cash flow royalty rate on oil sands was 25 percent and is paid if the 
amount is more than the minimum royalty as discussed above.  Post 2009, the rate varies 
according to the price of oil.  For prices below $55, the royalty rate remains 25 percent.  
The rate rises by 0.23 percent for each dollar increase in oil prices up to a maximum of 
40 percent when prices of oil are more than $120. 
 
                                                
4 While we have fixed the debt/capital ratio to be time invariant, see Mackie-Mason and Mintz [1991] for a 
more complicated version that allows for endogenous choice of debt policy. 
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Given the new Alberta royalty regime has varying royalty rates, one might wish to model 
explicitly royalty rates that vary by price over time.  This would be best handled by 
introducing a stochastic model that would enable one to consider marginal effective rates 
that vary according to market conditions.  It would be a complexity that is best handled 
for future work since its empirical application would be difficult to apply without 
characterizing the volatility and growth in oil prices.  For this reason, we take the simple 
case that royalty rate are constant. 
 
Under the corporate income tax, oil sand producers were given an additional deduction 
over and above regular depreciation for investment in “new mine assets”.  The regular 
deduction was at least 30 percent declining balance for new mines or major expansions of 
mines.  For oil sand producers, an additional deduction could be claimed against income 
earned from a project up to 100 percent of the cost of the asset.  The federal government 
is phasing out the accelerated deduction of costs. 
 
The royalty payment in the oil sands after payout, and assuming that the amounts are 
greater than the minimum royalty, is the following. 
 
TR = τ[PtQt- C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t - (δKt+kt)(1+π)t - et(1+π)t]  
 
The determination of output, Q, accords with the following Euler equation: 
 
(13) (1+r)-t(1-τ)(P-C’)(1-u) = λ 
 
The extraction decision is determined by selling output until the increase in the quasi-rent 
from higher prices net of marginal cost (p-C”) per dollar of quasi-rent is equal to the cost 
of finance.  
(14) (p –C”)/(P-C’) = R-π 
As in the conventional case, even though taxes do not appear in the left hand side of 
equation (14), they do influence the cost of finance (R) due to the deductibility of interest 
expense from corporate taxable income.  Thus, interest deductibility results in higher 
extraction as companies produce more output lowering the return until the capital gain 
from keeping the resource in the ground is equal to the cost of capital.     
Depreciable Capital 
The user cost for depreciable capital for the oil sands case is similar to equation (9), but 
royalties directly affect the cost of capital because current costs are deductible from the 
royalty base. That is, changes in the stock of capital reduce current costs which are netted 
from royalty payments with output assumed to be fixed.  
Royalties as a tax: 
(15) -CK =  (δ+R-π){1- τ(1-u) - uZ)}/[(1-u)(1-τ)]  
with Z = α/(α+R) 
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If royalties are treated as a cost, the expression is the same since the royalty paid at the 
margin is equal to zero. 
 
Inventory 
 
With First-in-First-out (FIFO) accounting, the nominal profit from holding inventories (I) 
is subject to corporate income tax (Boadway, Bruce and Mintz [1982]).  This implies the 
following cost of capital assuming inventories are held for less than one year: 
 
(16) –CI =  ((R–π)(1-τ(1-u))+uπ)/[(1-u)(1-τ)]. 
 
And if royalties are treated as a cost: 
 
(17) –CI (1-τ) =  ((R–π)(1-τ(1-u))+uπ))/1-u). 
 
(Note with corporate income tax exhaustion as discussed above, the corporate income tax 
rate is equal to zero for inventories held less than one year).  
 
Exploration and Development 
The user cost for exploration and development for the oil sands case is the following: 
(18) (P–C’)ft’ = (1-uZ –τ(1-u))(1+r)(T-t)/[(1-u)(1-τ)] 
for both the tax and cost cases respectively.  The term of Z is the typical CCA allowance 
by which the deduction could be used against other income.   
Note that if Z=1, capital costs are fully expensed and if there is no mismatch between 
deductions and income (such as t=T or r does not have interest deductibility for debt), the 
decision to invest is independent of corporate taxes.  
 
Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance and Corporate Tax Exhaustion 
 
It is possible, and in fact likely, that the expensing of capital costs under the accelerated 
cost deduction may not be fully used since it is limited to the project’s income.  In this 
case, corporate income is not taxed until the deductions are fully used up.  This case is 
similar to the tax holiday problem modelled by Mintz [1990].  During the years in which 
no corporate income tax is paid (until time X when the company becomes taxable), the 
present value of tax depreciation deductions changes from year to year until the company 
becomes taxable).  The cost of capital in this case will be the following: 
Royalties as a tax: 
(15’)  -CK =  (δ+R0-π){1- τ – uZt)}/(1-τ) + (1+R0-π)(uZt - uZt-1)/(1-τ) for t<X 
with Zt = Z(1+R)-(X-t) (with Z=1 for expensing when capital is written off fully at 
time X) and  R0= Bi+(1-B)ρ (the no-tax cost of finance). 
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Note that if other tax deductions cannot be used (as sufficient income is not earned), other 
costs of capital for depreciable assets and inventory are similarly affected due to changes 
in the present value of tax depreciation allowances varying from one year to the next.5  
 
 
Other Provinces 
 
It would be useful to note several additional issues that would affect the cost of capital 
expressions above arising from provisions applying in British Columbia, Newfoundland 
& Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan.  These include the following: 
 
1. Retail sales taxes in British Columbia and Saskatchewan on capital inputs would 
be equal to κ times the price of capital (which is normalized to be equal to unity in 
the model without loss of generality). 
2. Unlike Alberta, these four provinces have a corporate tax base harmonized with 
the federal base.  However, in practice, the modelling is not affected. 
3. An investment tax credit is provided at the rate φ.  It reduces the cost basis for 
annual depreciation allowances that is available in the Atlantic Provinces. 
4. Newfoundland & Labrador have a complicated royalty system whereby the rate 
depends on profitability.  This is discussed further below. 
 
Oil and gas provinces are abolishing capital taxes and hence these taxes are excluded 
from the analysis. 
 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan 
 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan levy royalties on the revenues received by the 
producer.  Like the federal government and Alberta, royalties are deductible from 
corporate income tax.  Therefore, the only significant difference between British 
Columbia and Saskatchewan from the Alberta case is that a sales tax, at the rate κ, applies 
to purchases of machinery and equipment under the retail sales tax.  Thus, the only 
adjustment in the formulae presented above is for depreciable capital: 
 
(19) -CK =  (δ+R-π)[(1-uZ)](1+κ)/(1-u). 
The interpretation of the above is obvious. 
 
 
                                                
5 For example, the cost of capital for other depreciable assets under tax exhaustion would 
be the following, assuming that depreciation deductions are used at time X (based on 
Mintz [1995]): 
 -CK =  (δ+R0-π){1- τ – uZt)}/(1-τ) + (1+R0-π) (uZt - uZt-1) )/(1-τ)  for t<X  with Zt = [(1-α)/1+R)(X-t)]Z    
with Z= α/(α+R) 
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Newfoundland & Labrador and Nova Scotia 
 
Leaving aside the royalty regimes, the tax structure of both Newfoundland & Labrador 
and Nova Scotia is similar to that of British Columbia and Saskatchewan except for the 
provision of the Atlantic investment tax credit, as mentioned above.  Further, both 
provinces have converted retail sales taxes to the Harmonized Sales Tax of which the 
base is identical to the federal Goods and Services Tax.  Therefore, the sales tax on 
capital purchases is refunded to the business and therefore does not affect the cost of 
capital.   
 
Where the two provinces differ significantly from other provinces is with respect to their 
royalty structures, which have a complicated impact on investment decisions.   
 
 
Newfoundland & Labrador 
 
The Newfoundland & Labrador offshore royalty is composed of two parts. The generic 
offshore royalty structure applies to all oil projects (except Hibernia and Terry Nova). 
• A basic royalty is charged on gross revenues (net of transportation costs) at rates 
rising from 1 percent to 7.5 percent as cumulative production rises.   
• A net royalty is paid after accumulated unused deductions for operating costs, 
capital costs, successful exploration costs, the basic gross royalty and the return 
allowance are exhausted.   
• The return allowance is an “interest” rate by which unused deductions are carried 
forward.  The return allowance rate is equal to the long-term bond rate plus an 
additional amount of either 5 or 15 percent.  Effectively, the allowance rate is far 
in excess of a market interest rate that would be used to preserve the time value of 
expensing capital costs and, hence, delays the time by which a net royalty is paid 
once unused deductions are exhausted.  
• The first tier net royalty is a 20 percent rate applied to net revenues once the 
payout begins after unused deductions are exhausted based on a return allowance 
equal to 5 percent plus the long-term government bond rate applied to 
unrecovered costs.  
• The basic royalty on gross revenues is credited against the tier one net royalty.   
• The second tier is a royalty rate of 10 percent applied to net revenues based on a 
return allowance equal to 15 percent plus the long-term government bond rate 
(and therefore incremental to the first tier royalty resulting in a potential royalty 
rate on net revenues).   
• The royalty rate therefore rises as the return on capital invested in the project 
rises.   
 
As for Hibernia and Terra Nova, the royalty is structured in a similar way to the generic 
system but at different rates than those given above.  The main point, however, is the 
royalty rate varies according to the profitability of a project.   
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To solve for the cost of capital, taking into Newfoundland & Labrador’s royalty regime6, 
the maximization problem in equations (1) and (2) are adjusted to account for three 
royalty payments: gross royalties (RG), tier one net royalties (RN1) and tier two net 
royalties (RN2).  This problem is far more complex since the royalty payments depend on 
profitability and the length of time taken up for upfront exploration and development and 
other capital and operating expenditures to be exhausted.  In principle, fluctuations in 
pricing could result in royalty payments varying amongst the three categories over time.  
 
Given that Newfoundland & Labrador’s unused deductions are carried forward at 
different return allowances to define tiers, a simple characterization of profitability is 
considered.  From time t=0….. T0, the oil and gas company only incurs exploration and 
development expenses (that can be written for corporate income tax purposes against 
other income), which make available reserves, X, as before.  Production begins after T0 
whereby the project incurs operating and capital costs.  However, for T0< t ≤ T1, the 
project only pays the gross royalty, RG = τ PtQt.  At time T1, the unused deductions that 
are carried forward at a return allowance rate, ψ1,   are fully used and the project now 
pays tier 1 royalties.  The tier one royalties are paid during the period from T1 to T2 equal 
the following after discounting: 
 
(20)  NR1 = ∑T1+1T2 (1+R)-tτ1{ PtQt - C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t} 
 
+ τ1(1+R)-T1∑0T1 {[PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t - et(1+π)t](1+ψ1)T1-t} 
 
  
The latter part of equation (20) reflects the payment of tier one royalties for the first time 
when the carryforward value of unused deductions is fully exhausted (note the payment is 
discounted at time T1 when tier one payouts begin).   
 
Similarly, for tier 2 royalties, NR2, we have the expression: 
 
(21)  NR2 = ∑T2+1∞ (1+R)-tτ2{PtQt - C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t} 
 
+ τ2(1+R)-T2∑0T2 {PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t - et(1+π)t}(1+ψ2)T2-t} 
 
To simplify the analysis (at least to some extent), it is assumed that the gross royalty is 
fully credited against the tier one net royalties.  The expression for the user cost of capital 
when the gross royalty is only paid is taken to be similar to the conventional oil and gas 
project in Alberta.  Hence, we ignore the gross royalty altogether.   
 
Using the expression for net royalties, the producers maximize the value of cash flows 
(choosing e, K and Q) according to the following: 
 
(22) Max V = ∑0∞ (1+R)-tCFt dt   
                                                
6 The Nova Scotia royalty is similar except that the unused deductions carried forward at a return allowance 
are not compounded. The effect of a non-compounding return allowance on the formula is straightforward 
and shown below. 
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  With  
 
CFt =  [PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t ](1-u)(1- τ2)  
                           - (δKt+kt)(1+π)t [(1-uZ)(1-ø)-τ2(1-u)]  
 
for t> T2, 
 
CFt = [PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t ](1-u)(1-τ2)– (δKt+kt)(1+π)t [(1-uZ)(1-ø)-τ2(1-u)] 
 
 +τ2(1-u)∑0T2-1 {PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t - et(1+π)t}(1+ψ2)T2-t 
 
at t= T2, 
 
CFt = [PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t ](1-u)(1- τ1)  
- (δKt+kt)(1+π)t [(1-uZ)(1-ø)-τ1(1-u)]  
 
for T2>t> T1, 
 
CFt = { [PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t ](1-u)(1-τ1)– (δKt+kt)(1+π)t [(1-uZ)(1-ø)-τ1(1-u)]   
 
 + τ1(1-u)∑0T1-1 {PtQt-C(Qt,Kt)(1+π)t – (δKt+kt)(1+π)t – et(1+π)t}(1+ψ1)T1-t 
 
at t= T1, 
 
CFt = – et(1+π)t (1-uZ)  0< t<T1, 
 
And  
 
 (23)  subject to  ∑T∞ Qtdt = X = ∑0T f[et]  (accumulated reserves equals total 
extraction). 
 
Note that the positive terms in the cashflow associated with the carryforward of unused 
deductions up to periods T2-1 and T1-1 under the two tiered royalties respectively act as 
tax credit at time T2 or T1 and hence lower tax payments in the first period that the new 
tier applies.  
 
The Euler conditions for extraction of oil and gas (Q) depend on the “regime” under 
which royalty regime operates (tier 1 or 2 royalties): 
 
 
(24)       [P-C’](1-u)(1- τ2) (1+r)-t = λ  for t > T2, 
 
 
(25) (1+r)-t[P-C’]{(1-u)(1- τ1)+[τ2(1-u)(1+ ψ1-R)T2-t)]} =  λ  
 
for T1< t<T2, 
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Equations (24) and (25) both yield the typical condition for production decisions whereby 
quasi- rents on deposits held in the ground would rise by the (after-tax) discount rate of 
the firm:  (p–C″)/(P-C′) = r.  With equation (25), however, an additional term arises from 
the higher royalty payment at T2 when the firm anticipates paying once reaching the new 
tier.  Specifically, production decision will shift down at t= T1 and t=T2 since the return 
allowance rate is more than the firm’s discount rate. 
 
Note it is possible that tier two may not be reached so equation (25) is irrelevant and only 
equation (24) holds for the case in which τ2 is replaced by τ1.  
 
Given that equations (24) to (25) hold, the costs of capital are derived by solving for K 
and e as follows: 
 
 
Depreciable Capital Investment 
 
For t> T2, 
 
(26)  -CK =  (δ+R-π){(1-uZ)(1-φ)- τ2(1-u)}/(1-u)(1-τ2). 
 
 
For T1< t<T2, 
 
(27)  -CK =  {(δ+R-π)[(1-uZ)(1-φ) – τ1(1-u)-τ2(1-u)(δ+π)(1+ψ2-R)T2-t]}/Y 
 
with Y = [1-τ1 -τ2(1+ψ2-R)T2-t)](1-u) 
 
Compared to the much simpler royalty system used in Alberta for oil sands, the 
Newfoundland & Labrador tiered royalty increases the tax levied on rents in the future 
once the resource company enters into future years. The tiered royalty structure also 
lowers the effective cost of investments since replacement cost depreciation (δ+π) 
reduces royalty payments at the higher tiered royalties.7   
As discussed above, the second tier royalty may not be reached which would simplify the 
above expression to a formula similar to equation (26), except that τ2 = τ1 and equation 
(27) can be ignored. 
                                                
7 Note that if there is a period in which only the gross royalty is paid, the user cost of capital for depreciable 
capital is adjusted as the following: 
For T0< t<T1, 
-CK =  {(δ+R-π)[(1-uZ)(1-φ)–τ(1-u) - τ2(1-u)(δ+π)(1+ ψ2-R)T2-t)  
– τ1(1-u)(δ+π)(1+ ψ1-R)T1-t]}/N 
with 
N = [1-τ1 -τ2(1+ ψ2-R)T2-t) -τ1(1+ψ1-R)T1-t)](1-u) 
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Exploration and Development 
The user cost of capital for exploration and development expenses under the 
Newfoundland & Labrador tiered royalty is derived by choosing e, making use of one of 
the three alternative Euler conditions for the extraction decision, all of which, are set 
equal to λ (the simplest is equation (24) so long as the project is expected to eventually 
reach tier 2 – otherwise alternative Euler conditions should be used and adjusted for the 
fact that tier 2 is not reached8): 
 
(28)   (P–C’)ft’ = (1+r)(T2-t){1-uZ- τ2(1-u)(1+ψ2-R)T2-t- τ1(1-u)(1+ψ1-R)T1-t}/ W 
 
with  W = (1-u)(1-τ2). 
Note that even with expensing (Z=1), the user cost for exploration and development will 
not be independent of royalty rate since the allowance allows the expenses reduce tier one 
or tier two payments in future years.  Given the discounting factors involved, it is an 
empirical matter to determine whether the effective tax and royalty rate as it affects 
exploration is positive or negative for exploration and development expenses.  
 
Nova Scotia 
 
Nova Scotia uses a similar profit-sensitive approach although it differs in three ways 
from the Newfoundland & Labrador approach.  First, the federal investment tax credit 
reduces project costs.  Second, eligible costs include past royalties paid to determine the 
computation of the project payout (but not the net revenue).  Third, Nova Scotia does not 
compound the return allowance.  The generic regime (that does not apply to Cohasset-
Panuke and Sable Offshore Energy Project) has four tiers.  The first tier is a 2 percent 
royalty applied to gross revenues.  The second tier is a 5 percent royalty applied to gross 
revenue once accumulated revenues are in excess of accumulated operated and capital 
project costs and the non-compounded rate of return allowance, which is equal to the 
long-term bond rate plus 5 percent.  The third tier is 20 percent royalty on net revenues 
once unused operating and capital costs, carried forward on the long-term bond rate plus 
20 percent, is exhausted.  The fourth tier is similar except unused deductions are carried 
forward at the long-term bond rate plus 45 percent. 
 
 
                                                
8 For example if tier one is only reached, the user cost of capital is as follows:  
 
(P–C’)ft’ = (1+r)(T2-t){1-uZ- τ1(1-u)(1+ψ1-R)T1-t)}/ (1-u)(1- τ1). 
 
Note that if only tier one is ever reached, the user cost for depreciable capital is similarly affected in the tier 
two would be ignored in expression  
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Without developing the full analysis, we take note that the absence of compounding 
under the Nova Scotia system implies that the discounted return allowance is equal to 
(1+(T1-t)ψ1/(1+R)T1-t) (instead of (1+ψ1-R)T1-t) in expression (30) and investment tax 
credit reduces the cost of investment for royalty purposes as well (the use of royalties to 
determine the payout extends the length of time when the project reaches a new tier).  
This implies the following: 
 
For t> T2, 
 
(29)    -CK =  (δ+R-π){(1-φ)(1-uZ)- τ2(1-u)}/(1-u)(1-τ2). 
 
 
For T1< t<T2, 
 
 (30)   -CK = (δ+R-π)[(1-φ)(1-uZ) -τ1(1-u) -τ2(1-u)(δ+π)(1+(T1-t)ψ1/(1+R)T1-t]/Y 
 
 
with Y = [(1-τ1 -τ2(1+(T1-t)ψ1/(1+R)T1-t)](1-u). 
 
Effective Tax Rates 
For application, we simply refer to how the above formulae are converted to effective tax 
rates on capital, consistent with the past literature. 
Effective tax rates are estimated as marginal rate of return on capital, gross of taxes, net 
of marginal rate of return, net of taxes, taken as proportion of the gross-of-tax rate of 
return on capital.  The marginal rate of return on capital is the user cost of capital net of 
economic depreciation.  For example, for depreciable capital, the marginal rate of return 
on capital investments, net of depreciation, is equal to the following: Rg = -CK – δ.  The 
net of tax rate of return on capital is equal to Rn = Bi + (1-B)ρ – π.  
The effective tax rate is calculated as T =  (Rg - Rn)/ Rg. 
The formulae developed above will need to be empirically implemented to draw 
conclusions regarding the impact of various fiscal regimes on oil and gas investments.  
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